During the first four months of 2026, the Signal Ocean Platform recorded 787 crude voyages lifted from Russian ports, for a combined total of approximately 593 million barrels. This insight goes a level deeper than the dashboard view above: using basic flight records, it examines who is operating the payload commercially. It isolates the share of flights carrying CPC blend of Kazakh origin rather than real crude of Russian origin.
Three findings stand out. First, Western commercial operators (the G7 alliance) participate in 38% of Russian port lifting operations, but only 26% once the CPC mix is stripped out. Second, the share of sanctions in the total flow rises from 47% on the headline (including CPC) to 57% on a real Russian crude oil basis. Third, the Western fleet active in this trade is essentially old: 53% of the 162 participating Western ships are more than ten years old, rising to 58% of the 110 ships that touched actual Russian goods at any point in that period.
Commercial Operators – Western share declines sharply once CPC is removed
Western market share, initially recorded at 38%, drops to 25.7% after excluding CPC Blend flights. This represents the most significant discrepancy identified in the study: specifically, of the 299 Western flights, 134 – representing about 50% – constitute CPC blend operations at the Novorossiysk-CPC terminal, which involves transporting crude of Kazakhstani origin rather than oil of Russian origin.
In contrast, the unknown/unattributed category remains largely unchanged across both analytical perspectives, being modified from 290 to 287 trips. Thus, activity within this group consists almost entirely of exports of genuine Russian origin. This sector shows the highest concentration of sanctions risk, with 90.3% of unidentified voyages involving vessels designated by the EU, OFAC or OFSI.
Western countries (G7 alliance) – greater exposure to real Russian crude per vessel size
- CPC mix: 134 flights (44.8% of Western total).
- Actual Russian Origin: 165 flights (55.2% of Western total).
- Unlike the Suezmax vessels, which primarily carry CPC blend (of Kazakh origin), the Aframax vessels are the backbone of true crude of Russian origin.
- 72.5% of Aframax flights (58 out of 80) carry real Russian crude.
- In contrast, only 46% of Suezmax flights (96 out of 208) carry actual Russian crude, the majority of which is exempt CPC blend.
- Lower overall volume than Suezmax: While Aframax is the second largest vessel size in use, its overall volume (80 voyages) is much lower than that of Suezmax (208 voyages), representing approximately 27% of the total Western operated fleet in this data set.
The CPC mix is loaded at the Novorossiysk-CPC marine terminal but originates from Kazakhstan, and is shipped via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium via southern Russia. Within the Russian port system captured on the platform, the CPC complex (terminal plus SBM) is the largest single loading point of the period. The table below shows what happens when this flow coming from Kazakhstan is isolated:
The distribution of voyages across ship classes reveals a distinct operational preference based on the origin of the shipment. Suezmax vessels are almost evenly split between CPC blends and real Russian crude, with 112 trips (53.8%) dedicated to CPC blends originating from Kazakhstan and 96 trips (46.2%) carrying real Russian oil.
In contrast, Aframax aircraft show a significant bias towards genuine Russian exports, with 58 out of 80 flights (72.5%) carrying goods of Russian origin, while only 22 flights are attributed to CPC operations. The MR2-class entry is uniquely specialist, with all 11 registered flights having been used exclusively in the real Russian trade.
This trend is consistent with the logistical requirements of the underlying trades. Longer routes from Novorossiysk-CPC favor the economies of scale offered by the Suezmax’s larger payload. Conversely, shorter sea routes, such as the Baltic to Europe and Baltic to Mediterranean routes, are more efficiently served by Aframax aircraft and, for the smallest parcel sizes, by MR2 aircraft.
Monthly trend – Western activity built during this period
- Significant growth in activity: Total flights by Western operators rose from 65 flights in January to 87 flights in April, representing an increase of 33.8% over the four months.
- Dominance of Suezmax ships: Suezmax ships are the primary ship class used by Western operators, accounting for the majority of voyages each month. Their activity peaked in March with 61 flights.
- Aframax usage rises: There has been a steady increase in the use of Aframax vessels, which rose from 16 trips in both January and February to 27 trips in April.
Flight activity within the western group showed a clear upward trajectory over the four months. After relatively stable levels in January and February, with 65 and 63 flights respectively, activity accelerated significantly in March to 84 flights before reaching a four-month peak of 87 flights in April (+38%). From a fleet composition perspective, Suezmax vessels consistently dominated the trade pattern, maintaining a stable and significant contribution throughout the period with monthly voyages ranging from 45 to 61 voyages. Aframax participation showed greater monthly fluctuations, ranging between 16 and 27 trips. Meanwhile, MR2 vessels accounted for only a limited share of total activity; However, their participation remained constant throughout the four months.
Exposure to penalties
The increase in the sanctioned share from 46.9% to 56.9% is primarily a result of removing non-sanctioned CPC Blend flights from the data set, which concentrates the sanctioned activity within a smaller overall set of flights. After excluding shipments from the CPC mix originating from Kazakhstan, the remaining 643 actual flights of Russian origin show a much higher exposure to sanctions. Western-run activity remained almost fully compliant, with 99.4% of flights classified as non-sanctioned. In contrast, the unknown/unattributable portion represented 44.6% of prior CPC sanctioned voyages and represented the main focus of sanctioned activity, with 262 of the 287 voyages (90.2%) conducted by vessels subject to EU, OFAC, or OFAC sanctions. The findings highlight a clear distinction between the G7-compliant infrastructure supporting Kazakhstan’s CPC blend exports and the shipping networks transporting actual crude of Russian origin.
Age of the Western fleet – structurally old, especially on real Russian cargo
The 162 Western-operated ships active in this trade are weighed in old tons. Suezmax dominates the count (114 ships out of 162) and is the oldest sub-fleet – only 19 out of 114 ships are less than five years old, while 56 ships are more than ten years old. Aframax (45 ships) shows a similar skew: 7 modern, 29 out of ten.
Looking at the 110 Western ships that specifically touched goods of Russian origin (previous CPC view): 64 of the 110 are more than ten years old (58%), and only 16 are less than five years old (15%). The implication is that the Western fleet that remains active in real Russian crude traffic after CPC stripping is significantly older than headline Western fleet numbers indicate, and dominated by Suezmax tonnage that is nearing the end of its traditional commercial life.
Key Takeaway: Two points of view tell different stories
The main platform view describes Russian port export trade of 593 million barrels, which is dominated by Aframax and Suezmax tonnage and mainly split between Chinese, Indian, Mediterranean and Continental destinations. This picture is as correct as it gets, but it combines two functionally different cargo flows: real Russian origin crude (subject to the G7 price cap) and CPC blend (Kazakh origin, outside the cap, but loaded at a Russian port).
Separating these two streams from each other fundamentally changes operator image and compliance. The share of the Western operator (G7 alliance) decreases by twelve percentage points (38.0% → 25.7%) when CPC is removed. The total share subject to sanctions rises by ten percentage points (46.9% → 56.9%) for the same reason. And the Western fleet that is still involved in the movement of true Russian origin, after excluding the CPC hike, is older than the main Western fleet numbers indicate.
Discover the data that drives these stories
This insight was produced by combining the Signal Ocean Platform’s oil flows dashboard (shown above). The platform supports interactive filtering by shipping group, origin and destination area, stationary vessel, and date grouping; The Trip Details dashboard and Signal Ocean Data Warehouse APIs display key logs that support the operator-level analysis presented here.
methodology
• Source: Signal Ocean Platform flight logs, crude oil lifting operations outside loading ports in the Russian Federation, January 1 to April 30, 2026.
• The basic flight summary contains only the name of the business operator – no country, jurisdiction, parent company or beneficial owner field.
• CPC Classification: Any flight that has an origin port that has a “CPC” tag as a CPC Blend. All other Russian ports (Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Murmansk, Kuzmino, Nakhodka, Sabetta, Prigorodnoye, Novorossiysk non-CPC) are classified as being of genuine Russian origin.
• Sanctioned = The vessel appears on at least one EU, OFAC, or OFSI classification list in the source dataset.
• Numbers are numbers of flights, not market share in tons.
All statements, estimates and forecasts presented here are based on information available as of (May 22, 2026). While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, the analysis is subject to revision as additional information becomes available.
Source: Al Ishara Group
